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Abstract— There exists a large number of suggestions for 
how to measure security, and in many cases the goal is to 
find a single overall metric of security. Given that security 
is a complex and multi-faceted property, we believe that 
there are fundamental problems to find such an overall 
metric. Thus, we suggest a framework for security metrics 
that is based on a number of system attributes taken from 
the security and the dependability disciplines. We then 
regroup those attributes according to an existing 
conceptual system model and propose a metrication 
framework in accordance. We suggest that there should be 
metrics related to protective attributes, to behavioural 
attributes and possibly to system correctness. Thus, the 
main idea is that security metrication should be split up 
and related to a number of specific attributes, and that a 
composite security metric is hard to define.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we will suggest a novel security 
metrication approach that is based on a combined 
security/dependability model [11]. There have been 
several previous attempts to present various frameworks 
and directions in the security metrication research field. 
The first comprehensive attempt towards structuring the 
security measurement and metrication research was 
carried out at the WIISSR workshop [18]. Other 
proposals and extensions to this were made in e.g. [2-5], 
[7], [12-17] and [20]. 
In this paper we start out from a conceptual 
security/dependability model that describes a system’s 
interaction with its environment via the system 
boundaries [11]. Based on the model we regroup the 
traditional security and dependability attributes into 
protective attributes, behavioural attributes and 
correctness and we suggest a framework for how to 
define metrics in accordance. 
In the following, section II briefly describes the security 
model. In section III two main approaches toward 
model-based security metrication are suggested and the 
implication of the security model for metrication is 
discussed. Section IV highlights some important 
relations among the protective and behavioural 
attributes. Finally, we conclude the paper in section V. 
II. A PROPOSED SYSTEM SECURITY MODEL 
This section gives a brief description of the system 
model for security and dependability attributes 
originally proposed in [11]. Once again, for simplicity, 
we use the term security to denote the combined 
concept of security and dependability. Normally 
security is decomposed into three different aspects: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability [6], whereas 
dependability is decomposed into the attributes: 
availability, reliability, safety, integrity and 
maintainability [1]. 
Our approach is that the security of a system should be 
understood in relation to its environment, in terms of 
system input and output. First, we define the system 
that we are considering, the object system. It is 
important to clarify the boundaries of the object system, 
since the subsequent discussion of the security model is 
based upon a well-defined system. The object system 
may be arbitrarily complex: a single computer, a 
computer network or possibly a whole organisation, 
including people. Note that by studying a larger system 
more of the potential problems are “embedded” into the 
system as internal or insider problems. These problems 
are not directly addressed in the paper. Conceptually, 
the object system interacts with the environment in two 
basically different ways. The object system either 
receives an input from the environment, or delivers an 
output to the environment. See figure 1. The input to the 
system is denoted environmental influence. The 
environmental influence may be of many different 
kinds. It may be the “normal” input provided by the 
authorized user of the system. We have termed this 
concept accessability. However, the type of interaction 
we are mostly interested in here is that which involves 
fault introduction. Malicious, external faults, i.e., 
attacks, are particularly interesting. Such faults 
originate from a threat in the environment. The threat 
may be a human being, a natural phenomenon or 
another computer system, among other things. The 
threat launches an attack towards the system. The 
attack will be successful if it can exploit a vulnerability 
in the system so that an intrusion results. The presence 
of the intrusion can be regarded as an error (or 
erroneous state) in the system. Note that a vulnerability 
is a passive feature of the system as opposed to an error. 
The error may (or may not) propagate and lead to a 
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system failure. This depends on the implementation of 
the system, how it is operated, what defensive 
mechanisms are active etc. Thus, there is a causal 
relationship between those impairments: external 
fault/attack, error/intrusion and failure. We can also see 
that there are three basic ways to break the causal chain 
of unwanted events and to counter the propagation of 
impairments: threat reduction, boundary protection and 
recovery. See figure 1. Further details on impairments 
and their interaction can be found in [10] and [1].  
We will now discuss the relation between these 
impairments and security aspects. Since faults are 
detrimental to the system, we seek to design the system 
such that the introduction of faults is prevented. We 
denote this ability integrity. It is thus a protective 
attribute of security. It is our opinion that the integrity 
attribute is in effect the essence of security. The 
conceptual output from the object system is the system 
behaviour. The system behaviour includes the notion of 
service delivery to the USER(s). As originally observed 
in [11] there are two fundamentally different types of 
users: authorized users (called USERs) and 
unauthorized users (called NON-USERs). This in itself 
might be evident, but the importance of the observation 
lies in the fact that the required system behaviour is 
different for USERS and NON-USERS. Thus, the 
behavioural attributes are of two types: delivery-of-
service and denial-of-service. The desired (and 
preferably specified) delivery-of-service to the USER is 
described by the availability and reliability aspect.  
 
Another desired quality is that the system shall have an 
ability to deny service, denoted denial-of-service, to the 
NON-USER. (This is marked as a bold “stop-bar” in 
figure 1.) Note the duality of these concepts. The 
normal and preferred situation for the USER, i.e. that 
the service is indeed delivered, implies a failure with 
respect to the NON-USER and vice versa. If the service 
denied relates to information it is described by the 
behavioural attribute confidentiality. In case it relates to 
other services we use the word exclusivity [21]. Thus, 
exclusivity is the ability of the system to deny any 
unauthorized use of system service. 
Finally, the safety attribute introduces another aspect of 
system behaviour. It models the severity of a failure. In 
its most primitive, binary form it maps failures into 
catastrophic and non-catastrophic failures. Safety 
failures represent subsets of reliability/availability 
failures or confidentiality/exclusivity failures. An 
example of a “catastrophic failure” is a failure in the 
drive-by-wire system of a car that would lead to an 
accident, with possible casualties. Another example is 
the unauthorized disclosure of secret, military 
information that would have disastrous consequences in 
case of war. 
The maintainability attribute has no place in our model, 
as it does not describe an operational system-
environmental interaction.  
III.  SECURITY METRICS BASED ON THE SYSTEM 
MODEL 
A. Defining Two Different Types of Security Metrics 
The conceptual system model presented in section II 
suggests that security metrics could be defined 
according to the suggested two types of system-
environment interaction. Thus, we could define 
protective security metrics (referring to the input) and 
behavioural security metrics (referring to the output). 
As already noted, we believe that protective security 
captures the most important characteristics of security, 
and in particular the notion of protection. Consequently, 
it could be launched as a new security definition. 
Behavioural security is dependent on protective security 
and in this respect it is secondary to it. One could chose 
to call behavioural security something else, e.g. 
dependability or trustworthiness.  
It should also be possible to define some kind of 
internal metrics that would reflect the correctnesss of 
the system. It could be discussed whether correctness is 
really a security attribute or not. We have chosen to 
Figure 1. An Integrated Model of Security and Dependability 
handle it as a separate concept as it does not directly 
interact with the environment. 
In the following we will define and discuss these kinds 
of metrics in some detail.  
 
B. Protective  Security Metrics 
1) How could protective security be measured? 
Protective metrics should assess the extent to which the 
system is able to protect itself against unwanted 
external influence, e.g. external attacks. Normally, we 
assume that there is some kind of malicious intent 
involved in this influence, but you could also think of 
situations when the unwanted input is the result of e.g. a 
mistake made by an “ordinary” USER. We do not 
attempt to suggest a more exact definition for this case, 
as it will not affect the overall reasoning or treatment of 
the situation.  
There are at least two different approaches to measure 
protective security. The first one is called system-
related and refers to the system’s ability to protect itself 
in terms of protection mechanisms. The other one is 
called threat-related. It measures security in terms of 
the effort an attacker has to expend in order to make an 
intrusion. These two approaches are detailed below. 
2) Metrics based on security protection mechanisms  
As mentioned in the preceding section, one approach 
toward protective security measurement is to measure 
security based on the three fundamental methods to 
avoid failures in a system (“defence lines”): threat 
reduction, boundary protection and (internal) recovery. 
The measure would be based on the combined strength 
of all involved security mechanisms. It is not a priori 
evident how to calculate the combined strength. The 
input protection will not necessarily be higher if 
stronger mechanisms are involved. This is due to the 
fact that the protective strength rather lies in the fact 
that there are no weak mechanisms. Or in other words, 
there should be no vulnerabilities or “holes” in the 
system in order for it to be well protected. Therefore, it 
is a non-trivial task to find a method for such a 
combination of the effect of a number of protective 
mechanisms.  
3)  Using attacker effort as a protective security 
metric 
The second way to measure security is to base the 
metric upon the effort that has to be expended by an 
attacker in order to make a breach into the system, i.e.  
to compromise integrity. This approach was first 
proposed by Littlewood et al. [19]. The idea is that an 
effort-based measure should be representative of all 
environment factors having effect on the attacker’s 
effort to make a successful intrusion. The main 
contributing factors of effort are the time it takes to 
carry out the attack and the skill level of the attacker. 
However, many other parameters have to be considered: 
population of attackers, attack space size, reward effect 
on attackers’ behaviour, system feedback to the 
attacker, attackers’ willingness, etc.  
 
An attempt to make a real measurement by performing 
supervised attack experiments was reported in [8]. This 
work showed that it is in principle possible to find a 
metric for effort. In this simplified case the metric was 
Mean Time To Intrusion1
C. Behavioural Security Metrics 
 (MTTI), i.e. the average time 
used by an attacker to make an intrusion. It was also 
shown that, given certain pre-conditions the MTTI 
metric could be combined with a MTTF metric derived 
from random errors, such as component errors. 
However, the practical metric from such an experiment 
has limited applicability and does only reflect the 
security of the used system at the time of measurement. 
It remains to be demonstrated how to make 
measurements that are generally applicable and that 
could serve to make predictions of the security of other 
similar systems.  
As suggested by the model, the behavioural security 
attributes2
Reliabilty is the expected time duration the system is 
operating  before it fails in delivering its service. The 
common metric for this purpose is Mean-Time-to-
Failure (MTTF).  
 are: reliability, availability, safety, 
confidentiality and exclusivity. There are already a 
large number of metrics suggested for reliability, 
availability and safety and they could readily be 
incorporated into the framework. Confidentiality and 
exclusivity metrics are less well investigated. Below we 
shortly describe existing or proposed metrics for 
behavioural security attributes.  
Availability on measures to which degree, often 
expressed in percent, the system is capable of delivering 
its service taken into account the alternation of service 
delivery and non-delivery [22]. A common steady-state 
availability metric is calculated as: Mean Time To 
Failure/ (Mean Time To Failure + Mean Time to 
Repair)).  
Safety evaluates the absence of catastrophic 
consequences on the USERs and the environment in 
case of a failure [22].  
A common metric for safety is Mean Time to 
Catastrophic Failure (MTTCF) and it is defined in 
analogy with Mean Time To Failure.  
Confidentiality  is the ability of the system to keep 
sensitive information confidential with respect to NON-
USERs. We have not found  many proposals for how to 
measure confidentiality [9]. 
The concept of exclusivity is not widely used and we 
know of no suggestions for how to measure it. 
However, it seems plausible that an approach similar to 
that of confidentiality could be adopted. 
D. Correctness  Metrics 
Correctness should be assessed with respect to the 
internal state of the system. This means that we have to 
define a state that could serve as a template for “full” 
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2 Or more accurately: security and dependability related attributes 
correctness and then measure the actual deviation from 
this state. However, there are several problems to define 
correctness in practice. For one thing we have to 
distinguish between correctness of the data in the 
system and the system itself, i.e. the programs, 
mechanisms, hardware, etc. It should be possible, even 
if not trivial,  to define what is meant by correct data, 
for example in a database, but it seems harder to define 
correctness for the system itself. If we could find a good 
correctness definition, the next step would be to find the 
degree of incorrectness, i.e. the deviation from the 
correct state. We are not aware of any research attempts 
to address this problem and we will not make any such 
suggestions in this paper. We limit ourselves to observe 
that a correctness metric will be needed to make the set 
of system-related metrics complete.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
We realize that the behavioural attributes of the system 
are dependent upon the environmental threats, 
protection mechanisms and the internal recovery 
mechanisms. As a conclusion, the behavioural 
attributes, e.g. reliability, vary with respect to the 
strength of the three defence lines in the system in such 
a way that a better defence will lead to increased 
reliability. Thus, the better the defence mechanisms are 
the higher becomes the reliability of the system. 
Therefore, higher integrity (“security”) will lead to 
higher reliability. The same reasoning is of course also 
valid for availability, safety, confidentiality and 
exclusivity. It should be noted that this effect will apply 
even if the defence mechanisms only present a delay of 
impairments’ propagation, a latency effect.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have suggested a framework for security 
metrication that is based on an input-output-related 
system model for security and dependability. The model 
describes the attributes of these two concepts and how 
they interact with the system’s environment. This leads 
us to the conclusion that there are at least two possible 
sets of security metrics: protective security metrics, 
related to the system input, and behavioural security 
metrics, related to the system output. We have no firm 
opinion on how to treat correctness at this stage. As 
behavioural security metrics we incorporate those 
already defined from the dependability discipline. We 
suggest that protective security, i.e. integrity, is the one 
that is nearest to the essence of traditional security 
concept and could possibly be adopted as a new, more 
limited definition of security. We suggest two methods 
for the metrication of protective security.  
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